Will the PDM be able to establish democracy in Pakistan?

Blurb: The PDM's effort to oust Imran Khan's government gives the Islamists greater leverage to negotiate their demand to further Islamise the state with both the leading parties and the army. This may end up helping the military brass maintain the status quo.

Pakistani leftist scholar Hamza Alavi once stated that Pakistan's postcolonial state was the classic example of the 'overdeveloped' state because its inherited colonial bureaucratic-military apparatus dominated both government and society (THE STATE IN POST-COLONIAL SOCIETIES: PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH – Hamza Alavi). As a result, unlike in India, political parties in Pakistan have never been able to establish hegemony over the state system. Since the first military takeover in 1958, the state has always directly or indirectly been controlled by the military elites. Former premier Nawaz Sharif, clearly pointing to the extended role of the army in current Pakistani politics, has said that the 'state within a state' has become a 'state above the state' (Pak army a state above the state, says Nawaz Sharif as Oppn unites against military leaders – Hindustan Times, Sept 20, 2020).

Until recently, no one has openly dared to challenge its dominance. Now, for the first time in history, the mainstream political parties are overtly projecting their intention to overturn the longstanding power equilibrium. In their endeavour to shift the balance of power, leading political parties formed an 11-party alliance, called the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), where all major parties—with the exception of Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan—have united to oust Imran Khan's government, which they denounce as an illegal, military-backed regime.

After organising six major rallies, the PDM has given Premier Khan an ultimatum to resign (PDM's long march to Islamabad could also be to Rawalpindi: Fazl – Dawn, Jan 1, 2021). If he fails to comply, they have threatened to organise a long march towards Islamabad and to the army headquarters in Rawalpindi. Their goal is to put Pakistan on a path to democracy and to end the military's role in politics forever.

Will this campaign usher in democracy or will it simply shift the balance of power? Will it even be able to break the military's hold on power?

Mullah-Military Nexus  

No military-civil bureaucratic alliance can rule the country without establishing hegemony over a sizable section of the population. As a tactic of 'legitimising' its illegal seizure of the state apparatus, the military establishment has extensively exploited the country's Islamic religiosity. And in this process of exploitation, it has gained the support of the clerics and Islamist parties.

Historically, the clerics enjoy enormous influence in a relatively traditional society through the strong networking of mosques and madrasas. Because of the government's unwillingness and financial inability to establish necessary formal educational institutions, a sizable number of underprivileged students study in religious schools.

These students are the key backers of the Islamists that have a significant influence on politics. With their active support, the army brass has been able to unofficially institutionalise military dominance.

The country's military rulers have accommodated some of the Islamists and clerics' demands to Islamise the state by introducing limited Sharia Laws. In return, the religious leaders have extended their support for the military, relentlessly offering positive images of the army despite its engagement in massive corruption. This military-mullah partnership has enabled the military elites to remain at the helm of the state.

The Military Legacy of the PDM 

The political parties that have been in power—the PPP and the PML-N now belong to the PDM—rather than deviating from the military dictators' agendas, further accelerated the process of Islamisation. In Pakistan, there are constitutional bars against non-Muslims holding key positions, making them second-class citizens. On top of that, the infamous Blasphemy Act makes non-Muslims easy targets for persecution on religious grounds.

The problem of the PDM's motley alliance is that its participants are more interested in reducing the military's role than in removing any of the institutionalised discriminatory that also stands in the way of a full-fledged democracy. Like the military, the PDM is also wooing the mullahs, notably by naming Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the president of the religiopolitical party, Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam, as its head. This apparently gives them a political advantage over the military by preventing the PDM from being branded anti-Islamic and anti-Pakistani; this is the common rhetorical strategy used in Pakistan's theocratic-influenced culture to disqualify leftists, liberals, or nationalist detractors. At the same time, however, it signals that the alliance will not change any of the Islamisation reforms if they gain power and that it is the ideal alliance for safeguarding Islam.

The PDM has even signalled that, if necessary, it would accommodate further Islamist demands. Its leaders are in talks with the Jamaat to include it in the alliance—though the Jamaat is demanding that the PDM's platform must incorporate the full enforcement of Sharia (More groups to join PDM in coming weeks – The News, Oct 7, 2020).

The PDM alliance places the Islamist parties in a stronger position, enabling them to bargain with both the military and the political parties to further advance the agenda of transforming Pakistan into a complete Sharia state that they have been working towards since independence.

The Probable Scenario 

In the current reality, the PDM's endeavour to change the existing power balance has little chance of success. Since 1971, Pakistan's political parties have been unable to mobilise people to depose military rulers or sitting governments. Furthermore, the PML-N and the PPP, along with the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), have a history of cooperating with the military in order to stay in power.

In the current international scenario, the military establishment will not directly seize power because it will no longer enjoy American support as it has in the past. Instead, the military brass will maintain the present status quo through the PTI, or, if necessary, they will lure one or more parties away from the PDM. And the Islamists will certainly lend their support if the military promises to Islamise the state further.